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CASE COMMENTS
a reserve for bad debts when there is a transfer under section 851 or
a liquidation under section 337 of the Internal Revenue Code of
1954. The Supreme Court has granted certiorari in the Nash case.
Until there is a final decision, however, any taxpayer contemplating
a transfer or liquidation must exercise caution in transferring a
reserve for bad debts.
Philip Douglas Mooney
Juvenile Courts - Insanity Defense No Bar
To Adjudication of Delinquency
The bodies of two young girls were found in a wooded area
where they had been beaten to death with blunt objects. The
next day, H. C., a fifteen-year-old juvenile, was apprehended and
charged with delinquency for the killing of the two girls. The
factual evidence taken at the original hearing, including an ad-
mission by H. C., made it clear that H. C. had killed the girls in the
woods, returned home, and acted so naturally throughout the
evening that his parents noticed nothing unusual. Testimony at the
hearing from three psychiatrists, one called by the prosecutor and
two by the defense, established that H. C. suffered from schizo-
phrenia, and the unanimous conclusion was that he was neither cap-
able of controlling his actions nor of appreciating the consequences.
After an additional ninety-day psychiatric observation which yield-
ed the same conclusions and brought a recommendation of phychia-
tric care, the hearing continued on the matter of delinquency in
the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court, Morris County, New
Jersey. Held, inter alia, that proof of the defense of insanity under
the M'Naghten rule did not bar an adjudication of delinquency with
respect to a minor, even though he suffered from such disease of
the mind as would be a complete defense to criminal charges against
an adult. The juvenile was adjudicated delinquent and sent to a
state mental hospital, with the court expressly retaining jurisdiction
on the matter of discharge. In re State In Interest of H. C., 106 N.J.
Super. 583, 256 A.2d 822 (Juv. & D.R. Ct. 1969).
The basic issue before the court was whether there could and
should be an adjudication of delinquency in view of the psychiatric
testimony and evaluation which concluded that the juvenile, H. C.,
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was insane., In resolving this issue in the affirmative, the court
stressed the absolute necessity of the adjudication of delinquency
to give it power to invoke the state machinery for rehabilitation, 2
and distinguished between an adjudication of delinquency and a
criminal conviction.3 Even though the defense of insanity was not
allowed to bar an adjudication of delinquency, the court specifically
provided that H. C. was not subject to penal sanctions for his act.4
Although the defense urged that an adjudication of delin-
quency was barred by In re Gaultr, the New Jersey court was not
swayed by this argument. The Court said that when the fact of the
offense has been established, the defense of insanity does not in-
volve one of "those areas of constitutional concern over individual
rights" with which the recent decisions concern themselves.0
Defense counsel for H. C. also relied upon a Wisconsin case,
In re Win burn, in which insanity was held to be a defense to an
'In re State In Interest of I-OG., 106 NJ., Super. 583, 590, 256 A.2d 322, 325
(Juv. & D.R. Ct. 1969). The court said that the psychiatric evidence supported
the contention of the defense that the child was insane under the M'Naghten
rule, and that he would have a complete defense were he an adult charged
with a criminal offense.
'The court said that adjudication by the juvenile courts is the "touch-
stone" of the juvenile process, which allows the court to use its parens patriae
role to help the child. The adjudication "triggers" the juvenile court's use of
its power to protect, and its statutory power to provide for treatment and
rehabilitation. To allow the juvenile to use insanity as a defense to an adjudica-
tion of delinquency successfully would "handcuff the court, run contrary to
the basic theory of juvenile proceedings, and not be in the best interest of the
juvenile himself." Id. at 594, 256 A.2d at 328.
'Id. at 594, 256 A.2d at 327. The court distinguished between an adjudica-
tion of delinquency and an adult criminal conviction by saying that the former
brings only rehabilitative processes into play, while the criminal conviction is
attended by deterrent and punitive aspects in addition to rehabilitation.
"A juvenile who has been adjudicated delinquent based upon an anti-
social act committed while insane under the M'Naghten rule cannot be subject-
ed to penal sanctions." Id. at 596, 256 A.2d at 329.
'In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967), held that a juvenile before a juvenile court
must be accorded certain rights, although it is not a criminal proceeding. The
protections enumerated were: notice of charges, right to counsel; right to con-
frontation; right to cross-examination; and right against self-incrimination.
The New Jersey court recognized these principles as being applicable to juvenile
proceedings to insure that fair treatment was accorded to juvenile offenders,
but insisted that Gault should not be applied to hamper juvenile courts in exer-
cising their parens patriae role of providing protection and rehabilitation. Thus,
the court felt that as long as the exercise of the broad juvenile court dis.
cretion did not offend established standards of fair treatment, there was no
room for objection to the manner of achieving a result in the best interests of
the juvenile offender.
OIn re State In Interest of H. C., 106 N.J. Super. 583, 593, 256 A.2d 322,
327 (Juv. & D.R. Ct. 1969).739 Wis. 2d 159, 145 N.W2d 178 (1966).
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adjudication of delinquency. The Wisconsin court based its
decision mainly on the theory that failure to allow a defense of in-
sanity would offend the principles of fair treatment for juveniles.8
The New Jersey court considered the Winburn rationale but con-
cluded that it was not applicable to proceedings in the New Jersey
court. The New Jersey court observed that the best interests of the
juvenile were served because an adjudication of delinquency would
lead to treatment and rehabiliation. 9 In discussing the Winburn
case, the court also questioned the validity of the Winburn theory
that the social stigma attached to the term "juvenile delinquent"
was more harmful to a juvenile than a label of "insane."'10
Although the New Jersey and the Wisconsin courts reached
contrary conclusions on the question of whether insanity should
be a defense to an adjudication of delinquency, both courts recog-
nized that the juvenile process embodies a protective or parens
patriae philosophy."' This was demonstrated by the identical dis-
position of the juveniles in both cases.'12
There is no West Virginia case dealing with the question of
whether or not a defense of insanity would bar an adjudication of
delinquency in a juvenile court. Furthermore, juveniles are not al-
ways given the protection of the juvenile court process in West Vir-
ginia. By statute, juvenile courts in this state have exclusive juris-
diction over persons under sixteen, except those committing capital
Old. at 164, 145 N.W.2d at 184. The Wisconsin court observed that the dis-
pute concerning correct application of the insanity defense revolved around the
question of fairness to the defendant. It concluded that to allow this defense only
to adult offenders and not to juveniles would be inconsistent with standards
of due process and fair treatment. The court intimated that to deny a defense
of insanity to bar an adjudication of delinquency would also be inconsistent
with the philosophy of the juvenile court process.
'in re State In Interest of H.C., 106 N.J. Super. 583, 591-93, 256 A.2d 322,
326-27 (Juv. & D.R. Ct. 1969).
"The New Jersey court noted the comment of the Wisconsin court that
the term of "juvenile delinquent" is a " 'term of opprobrium and it is not soc-
iety's accolade bestowed on the successfully rehabititated," but concluded
that it was questionable whether the juvenile was less stigmatized by being
found "insane" without an adjudication of delinquency. Id. at 596, 256 A.2d at
328 & n.6.
'For a discussion of the history of the parens patriae principle and its
applicability in the juvenile process, see Note, The Parens Patriae Theory and
Its Effect on the Constitutional Limits of Juvenile Court Powers, 27 U. Prrr.
L. REv. 894 (1965-66).
'Both the New Jersey court and the Wisconsin court ordered psychiatric
care for the juveniles, and both courts retained jurisdiction on the matter of
discharge once rehabilitation was achieved,
1970]
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offenses.13 For example, in a 1956 decision a fourteen-year-old boy
was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to the penitenti-
ary at Moundsville. His defense of insanity under the M'Naghten
rule failed. 4
Additionally, there is no West Virginia case on the issue of
whether or not an adjudication of delinquency is a prerequisite to
committing a juvenile offender to an institution. Therefore, in
order to determine how West Virginia might decide the question
of whether or not an adjudication of delinquency is necessary be-
fore a juvenile court judge could fairly order a juvenile to be
committed to an institution or other facility for care, in the face
of what would amount to a successful defense of insanity in
an adult criminal proceeding, interpretation of the applicable
statutes must suffice. One such statute provides that "[i]f any
person charged with or convicted of crime be found, in the court
before which he is charged or was convicted, to be mentally ill, and
if such court shall order him to be confined in one of the State
hospitals, he shall be received and confined in it."'1 The clear
meaning of this statutory language is that a trial judge in a criminal
case may order a mentally ill defendant to be committed for care
without a conviction or an acquittal by reason of insanity. Logically,
the same principle might apply to the juvenile process, but it is not
clear that it does. 16 West Virginia does prohibit confinement of a
juvenile in the normal manner in the Industrial School for Boys
if the child is of unsound mind, imbecilic, or idiotic.17 But the
'See State v. Boles, 147 W. Va. 674, 130 S.E.2d 192 (1963); 50 W. VA. Oss.
A-r. GEN. 257 (1963).
" State v. Williams, No. F-27 (Intermediate Court, Ohio County, Apr. 5,
1956). This decision was discussed in Silverstein, Psychology, Mental Illness, and
the Law, 60 W. VA. L Rv. 133, 161 (1957), where the author pointed out that
"i]f the law had permitted the case to be tried by the juvenile court, a medically
oriented decision might have betn acceptable to the community .... "
W. VA. CODE ch. 27, art 6, § 7 (Michie 1966) (emphasis added).
1"Some confusion results from the rendering of an Attorney Generals opin-
ion that a juvenile court judge may commit a child convicted of a crime to
a mental institution. 45 W. VA. Ops. ATry. GE_,N. 378 (1953). This is especially
confusing since juvenile proceedings are not intended to be criminal. See State
ex rel. Hinkle v. Skeen, 138 W. Va. 116, 124, 75 S.E.2d 223, 227 (1953), where
the court observed:
The juvenile statutes do not attempt . . . to bestow upon juvenile
courts any criminal jurisdiction. The trial of a juvenile for deliquency
is in no sense a criminal trial. Such a trial is in fact for the purpose of
relieving a juvenile of acriminal trial, at least ir most cases .... The
juvenile court is not empowered to sentence a juvenile for the com-
mission of a crime.1 7
W. VA. CoDE ch. 28, art 1, § 2 (b) (Michie 1966).
[Vol. 72
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pertinent juvenile statute does not make it clear at what point the
court may act to make an appropriate disposition.-8 There are at
least three possible interpretations of this statute as to when one
of the enumerated dispositions may be made. First, the court could,
when the question of sanity is raised, order a hearing on that
question, before any hearing on the matter of delinquency, and in
an appropriate case could order care without any further pro-
ceedings and without an adjudication of delinquency. This was the
procedure followed in the Wisconsin case, in accordance with the
statutes of that state.19 The language of the West Virginia juvenile
statute would be subject to a similar interpretation if this juvenile
statute were supplemented by the provision for disposition of adult
offenders found to be mentally ill. : Second, the court could order
commitment or care after the juvenile proceedings, but before an
adjudication of delinquency, where the evidence adduced during
the juvenile proceedings demonstrated that the juvenile was men-
tally ill under the legal test of insanity. The West Virginia juvenile
statute standing alone is subject to such an interpretation. Third,
the West Virginia juvenile statute concerned with disposition could
also be interpreted in a manner similar to the interpretation which
the New Jersey court placed upon its statute,21 by requiring that
"s "With a view to the welfare of the child and of the State, the court or
judge may, after the proctedings, make any of the following dispositions ...."
W. VA. CODE ch. 49, art. 5, § 14 (Michie 1966) (emphasis added). The course
to be followed regarding the necessity of adjudication before disposition pre-
sumably depends upon the interpretation given to the phrase given emphasis
in the statute.
"' Wis. STAT. § 48.14 (3) (1955) provides: "If a child is before the court, al-
leged to be delinquent, and it appears that the child may be mentally deficient
or mentally ill, the court may order a hearing to determine whether the child
is mentally deficient or mentally ill .. .. Wss. STAT. § 48.24 reads as follows:
"The court may order any person coming within its jurisdiction to be examin-
ed by a clinical psychologist . . . appointed by the court, in order that the
condition of such person may be given due consideration in the disposition of
the case ....".
On the basis of these statutory provisions, the Wisconsin court held
the hearing on the juveniles mental condition, and thereafter ordered treat-
ment for him without further juvenile proceedings and without an adjudica-
tion of delinquency.
2'W. VA. CoDE ch. 49, art 5, § 14 (Michie 1966); W. VA. CODE ch. 27, art 6,
§ 7 (Michie 1966).
' N.J.SA. 2A:4-37 (b) (1946) provides: "The juvenile and domestic relations
court on proper cause shown may .. . Ecjommit the child (1) to a public in-
stitution established for the care, custody, instruction and reform of juvenile
offenders ...." (emphasis added).
The New Jersey court interpreted this statute to require an adjudication
of delinquency, even though the statute did not specifically mention it as a pre-
requisite to the authority to make such disposition. In re State In Interest of
H. C., 106 N.J. Super. 583, 594, 256 A.2d 322. 327 & n.A (Juv. & D.R. Ct. 1919).
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there must be an adjudication of delinquency before the court can
order treatment leading to rehabilitation for the juvenile.
22
In adopting any one of these statutory interpretations, the
West Virginia courts should be mindful of the standards of fair
treatment considered by the New Jersey and Wisconsin courts. This,
however, should pose no problem, for West Virginia, like New
Jersey and Wisconsin, recognizes the underlying principles of the
juvenile court process:" [J]uvenile courts are not for punishment
but are instrumentalities for determining needs as to training
and guidance for the child's better physical, mental and moral
development.
'" 23
While it is important that the juvenile process be utilized to
further the principles of care, guidance, treatment, and rehabilita-
tion-those things which are in the best interest of the juvenile-it
is equally important that juveniles not be denied due process and
fair treatment by an unwarranted, overextended use of the statutory
discretion given to the juvenile courts. An interpretation of the
West Virginia statute24 will settle the question, if and when the
issue is raised.
George William Lavender, III
Pleading - Real Subrogee is Not a Real Party
In Interest
In a diversity action in a federal court for damages resulting
from an automobile collision, the defendant moved that the
plaintiff's insurance carrier be joined as a party plaintiff. This
motion was made under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19, on the
grounds that the insurance carrier had paid plaintiff under his
deductible collision policy and was, therefore, subrogated to its in-
sured's rights to that extent. This, it was contended, made the
insurance carrier a real party in interest under Federal Rule of
'The phrase in W. VA. CoDE ch. 49, art. 5, § 14 (Michie 1966), "after the
proceedings" could easily be taken to mean, under a strict interpretation, that the
hearing must be completed and an adjudication of deliquency entered before
the court has the power to make one of the dispositions provided for in that
section.
57 W. VA. L. REv. 225, 226 (1955).
W. VA, CoEc gh. 49, art. 5, § 14 (Michic 1966).
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